This paper examines the effect of a change in U.S. trade policy on the domestic investment of U.S. manufacturers. Using a difference-in-differences identification strategy, we find that industries more exposed to reductions in import tariff uncertainty exhibit relative declines in investment after the change in trade policy. Within industries, we find that this relationship is concentrated among establishments with low initial levels of labor productivity, capital intensity and skill intensity. Plants with high initial levels of skill intensity, by contrast, exhibit relative increases in investment with exposure. We also find evidence that establishments' investment activity is smoother following the policy change.
Introduction
The U.S. manufacturing sector has undergone profound changes since the turn of the century, when a shift in U.S. trade policy increased import competition from China.
While a range of studies link this trade liberalization to employment loss and establishment exit, less is known about the extent to which survivors adapt by investing in new production processes or product upgrades.
1 Greater understanding of such reactions is particularly relevant in the current policy environment, where the 2016 U.S. Presidential election and the U.K.'s vote to exit the European Union have created considerable uncertainty among producers in some of the world's largest markets.
In this paper, we examine how the domestic investment and capital stocks of U.S. manufacturing establishments respond to the October, 2000 U.S. granting of Permanent Normal Trade Relations to China (PNTR), a trade liberalization that removed the threat of substantial U.S. import tari increases on Chinese goods. By eliminating this cost uncertainty, PNTR provided U.S. producers with greater incentives to invest in nding Chinese suppliers, moving production from the United States to China, or otherwise increasing their competitiveness in the face of rising Chinese import competition. We use industry-and establishment-level data on domestic investment by U.S. manufacturers to examine the latter channel.
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Our empirical analysis takes place in three steps. First, we examine the relationship between exposure to PNTR and both investment and capital stocks at the industry-level. Second, we use condential U.S. Census Bureau microdata to examine how individual establishments adjust investment in response to PNTR, with a particular focus on heterogeneous responses along a broad range of establishment-level attributes. The industry analysis serves as an important benchmark for our subsequent analysis of establishments because the expected impact of trade liberalization at the establishment-level is ambiguous: some plants may shrink or exit, lowering investment, while others may alter their production processes in ways that increase investment. 2 In prior research (Pierce and Schott (2016) ), we show that goods more exposed to PNTR exhibit substantial relative increases in U.S. imports from China as well as the number of U.S. rms that import from China, the number of Chinese rms that export to the United States, and the number of U.S.-Chinese rm pairs engaged in a trading relationship. One interpretation of these outcomes is that they reect investment in trading relationships that was unleashed by the elimination of cost uncertainty.
3 Pierce and Schott (2012) show that industries with greater exposure to PNTR exhibit relatively higher job destruction due to plant and rm exit and relatively lower job creation due to suppressed plant and rm entry.
Finally, motivated by models of investment under uncertainty, we investigate the timing, frequency, and lumpiness of establishments' investment before and after the change in trade policy.
We employ a generalized dierences-in-dierences (DID) identication strategy that estimates how investment and capital stocks change after the granting of PNTR for industries and establishments with varying levels of exposure. The baseline specication includes controls for other factors that may aect investment in manufacturing during our sample period, including changes in Chinese trade policy that occur as part of China's accession to the WTO (e.g. liberalization of export licensing), the phasing out of the global Multi-Fiber Arrangement governing quotas on developing-country textile and clothing exports, and changes in the relationship between investment and industry characteristics such as capital and skill intensity that may be correlated spuriously with the trade liberalization.
At the industry-level, we nd that greater exposure to PNTR is associated with a relative decline in investment, and that the timing of the decline corresponds closely to PNTR's implementation. We nd little evidence of such a response with respect to the capital stock, however, an outcome that may be due to the relatively slow response of capital stocks to changes in investment ows.
Our establishment-level analysis focuses on the investment activity of continuing plants observed in the quinquennial U.S. Census of Manufactures (CM). We nd that plant-level responses to PNTR vary according to their pre-PNTR characteristics. Specically, while PNTR is associated with a relative decline in investment for the average plant, establishments with higher initial levels of labor productivity and capital intensity exhibit little to no relative decline, and plants with the highest levels of initial skill intensity exhibit a positive relationship between exposure to the trade liberalization and relative investment. The relatively high investment associated with skill-and capital intensive plants is consistent with U.S. comparative advantage.
To assess the potential eects of PNTR's reduction of uncertainty on the frequency and smoothness of plants' investment, we use data from the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) to compute the average, standard deviation and share of years with positive investment across years leading up to and after the change in policy. Here, too, accounting for heterogeneity in establishment responses is important. In specications that control for plants' initial characteristics, we nd that, for the average plant, larger reductions in tari rate uncertainty are associated with relative reductions in the standard deviation of investment, though these reductions are not present for plants with initially high levels of productivity.
Our ndings make three contributions to the literature. First, they provide a broader view of the impact of trade liberalization on rms. While negative relationships between import competition and employment are well-known, especially for the period we are considering (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) ; Pierce and Schott (2016) ), our nding that higher exposure to PNTR is associated with lower industry-level in-vestment helps explain the reduction in overall manufacturing investment and the attening of the capital stock that has been noted elsewhere (Kurz and Morin (2016) ).
Furthermore, to the extent that depressed investment has dynamic eects on employment, our ndings provide insight into the potential persistence of weak employment and earnings growth in the years following a liberalization. Second, our results highlight the potential heterogeneity of responses to trade liberalization across plants within similarly exposed industries, and identies the characteristics of establishments including low labor productivity and high labor intensity that are associated with relatively greater declines in investment in the face of increased import competition. These results relate to the large literature studying the impact of competition on innovation and investment (e.g., Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Grith, and Howitt (2005) ). In this respect our research is most closely related to Gutierrez and Philippon (2017) ), which uses publicly available data from Compustat to show that increased exposure to PNTR induces relative increases in investment among leader rms, dened as rms with high market to book value. Compared to that paper, our contribution is twofold. First, we consider the full population of manufacturing establishments, as opposed to the publicly traded rms present in Compustat. Second, we examine a wider range of rm attributes such as capital and skill intensity and productivity that capture other dimensions of leadership, i.e., consistency with U.S. comparative advantage. Furthermore, our ndings also add additional context to recent research nding evidence in favor of trade-induced technical change (Bloom, Draca, and Reenen (2016) ) and a negative relationship between import competition and innovation (Autor, Dorn, Hanson, Pisano, and Shu (2016) ) among rms in the UK and United States, respectively, facing import competition from China.
Finally, we contribute to the relatively small number of empirical studies associated with the large theoretical literature on investment under uncertainty (Pindyck (1993) ; Rob and Vettas (2003) ). Finding plausibly exogenous shocks to uncertainty is an important challenge in in these studies and several papers, including Guiso and Parigi (1999) , Schwartz and Zozaya-Gorostiza (2003) , and Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen (2007) , have estimated such shocks using surveys, cost data for specic information technology investments, or detailed information from rms' annual reports. Here, PNTR provides a large and plausibly exogenous shock to establishments' cost uncertainty, and we identify eects on investment that are consistent with Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen (2007) .
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The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the data, Section 3 describes our empirical strategy and presents industry-level results.
Section 4 presents the establishment-level analysis and and Section 5 concludes.
4 For other studies on uncertainty in trade, see Handley (2014) and Handley and Limao (2017 6 While this sample is restricted, these long-lived plants typically account for a disproportionately large share of activity in the manufacturing sector. We deate the nominal investment in both these data and the CM and ASM using industry-specic investment deators contained in the database.
Because investment
6 This restriction arises from changes in the sampling frame for the ASM that occur every ve years, which prevent tracking some plants consistently over time. Furthermore, while some plants are sampled with certainty in the ASM, the threshold used for selecting these certainty cases changed several times over the period we consider.
7 Becker, Gray, and Marvakov (2013) is roughly equal to the decline experienced during the much-deeper Great Recession.
As a result, the manufacturing real capital stock fell from 2003 to 2004, the rst time it had registered a decline since the data have been tracked (Kurz and Morin (2016) ).
This decline can be seen in Figure 2 , which also reveals that most of the increase in manufacturing capital stock since the 1970s is in equipment versus structures. We follow Pierce and Schott (2016) in measuring the impact of PNTR as the rise in U.S. taris on Chinese goods that would have occurred in the event of a failed annual renewal of China's NTR status prior to PNTR,
We refer to this dierence as the NTR gap, and compute it for each SIC industry j using ad valorem equivalent tari rates provided by Feenstra, Romalis, and Schott (2002) for 1999, the year before passage of PNTR. As indicated in Figure 3 , which reports the distribution of NTR gaps across six-digit NAICS industries, NTR gaps vary widely, with a mean and standard deviation of 30 and 14 percentage points, with an interquartile range of 0.21 to 0.40. Analysis of the underlying NTR and non-NTR rates in Pierce and Schott (2016) reveals that seventy-nine percent of the variation in the NTR gap across industries is due to variation in non-NTR rates, set 70 years prior to passage of PNTR. This feature of non-NTR rates eectively rules out reverse causality that would arise if non-NTR rates were set to protect industries with declining employment or surging imports. Furthermore, to the extent that NTR rates were set to protect industries with declining employment prior to PNTR, these higher NTR rates would result in lower NTR gaps, biasing our results away from nding an eect of PNTR.
Other Policy Variables
Our empirical analysis includes controls for a wide range of additional factors that may aect U.S. manufacturing investment. (2003)).
We also control for changes in Chinese domestic and trade policies related to its accession to the WTO. These changes include reductions in export licensing requirements, production subsidies and import tari rates. Our controls draw on data from work on export licensing requirements by Bai, Krishna, and Ma (2015) , on production subsidies from Khandelwal, Schott, and Wei (2013) , and on Chinese import tari rates from Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, Wang, and Zhang (2017) . To account for the fact that reductions in barriers to foreign investment in China also declined at this time, we control for the share of industry inputs requiring relationship-specicity from Nunn (2007).
Finally, we control for other policy and macroeconomic shifts occurring in the U.S.
around 2000. The rst of these changes is the bursting of the 1990s tech bubble, which we control for with the interaction of the post-PNTR indicator with an indicator for whether the industry is engaged in the production of advanced technology products, as dened by the International Trade Commission. In addition, we control for the elimination of quotas associated with the phasing out of the global Multi-Fiber Arrangement (Khandelwal, Schott, and Wei (2013) ).
PNTR and Industry-Level Investment
As indicated in the large literature on the impact of competition on innovation and investment (e.g., Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Grith, and Howitt (2005) ), the relationship between PNTR and investment is theoretically ambiguous. Some establishments might step up investment in their U.S. operations in an eort to increase competitiveness vis a vis rising imports, while others might choose to exit the market, or cease domestic production in favor of production abroad. In this section we set the stage for our establishment-level analysis below by examining the aggregate impact of these decisions on investment at the industry level.
Our baseline dierence-in-dierences (DID) specication examines whether industries with higher NTR gaps (rst dierence) experience dierential changes in investment after the change in U.S. trade policy (second dierence) versus before, The third term on the right hand side is an interaction of the post-PNTR dummy variable and time-invariant industry characteristics, such as initial industry capital and skill intensity, the degree to which industries encompass high-technology products and the extent of initial union membership in the industry. These interactions allow for the possibility that the relationship between employment and these characteristics changes in the post-PNTR period in ways that might spuriously be related to the trade liberalization. δ j , δ t and α represent industry and year xed eects and the constant.
An attractive feature of this DID identication strategy is its ability to isolate the role of the change in U.S. trade policy. While industries with high and low NTR gaps are not identical, comparing outcomes within industries over time isolates the dierential impact of China's change in NTR status.
The rst three columns of 
Here, we estimate equation 3 Table 2 is also apparent in capital stocks. As indicated in Table 3 , we nd that higher 9 To further evaluate the role of the policy change versus other factors, Pierce and Schott (2016) compares the relationship between the NTR gap and manufacturing employment in the U.S. with that in the EU, which was not subject to a similar policy change. They nd that the negative relationship between exposure to PNTR and manufacturing employment is only present in the United States.
exposure to PNTR is associated with positive but statistically insignicant changes in the capital stock for total capital (column 1) and equipment capital (column 2) and negative and statistically insignicant changes in structures capital (column 3). One potential reason for the lack of a relationship between PNTR and the capital stock, unlike for investment, is that the capital stock adjusts slowly to changes in investment ows. An interesting question for further study is whether the relative weakening in investment may help explain the persistence of the reduction in manufacturing employment associated with PNTR (Pierce and Schott (2016) ). That is, while increases in investment may lead to subsequent rebounds in employment, declines in investment driven by establishment exit may have a long-run dampening eect on job creation.
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Finally, we examine the relationship between the change in U.S. trade policy and investment deators using equation 3. To conserve space, we summarize the results of 10 Fort, Pierce, and Schott (2017) show that more than eighty percent of the decline in manufacturing employment between 1977 and 2012 is due to net establishment death.
this regression in Figure 5 , which plots the 90 percent condence interval associated with an interquartile shift in industry exposure to PNTR. As indicated in the gure, we nd that industries with greater exposure to PNTR exhibit greater declines in their investment deators. One potential explanation for this relationship relates to plant closures. Pierce and Schott (2016) , for example, nd that plants with greater exposure to the change in policy are relatively more likely to shut down. If these closures increase the supply (on the secondary market) of the capital goods used to produce in that industry, their price might fall. 
PNTR and Establishment-Level Investment
In this section, we exploit the plant-level data available in the CM and ASM to determine the extent to which dierent plants in the same industry might vary in their response to PNTR. Plant-level analysis also permits examination of the extent to which changes in investment are driven by adjustments in average investment per year versus changes in the lumpiness of investment. We nd that in both cases, larger, more productive and more skill-and capital-intensive plants are less likely to adjust their investment activity in response to the change in U.S. trade policy.
Baseline Plant-level Estimates
We begin by examining the average investment responses of plants to PNTR without including terms that might account for within-industry heterogeneity. We use data from the CM, which covers the population of manufacturing establishments and is available every ve years. Our sample is composed of observations from the 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007 CMs and this baseline specication is as follows,
where p indexes establishments, j indexes industries and t indexes years. The dependent variable is one of three real investment shares total investment (i.e., total capital expenditures), investment in equipment, or investment in structures, where each is divided by the establishment's capital stock or the log value of the capital stock. The rst term on the right-hand side is the DID term representing the eect of PNTR, and it consists of the interaction of a P ost P N T R t indicator and the time-invariant N T R Gap j . The next two terms represent the additional control variables used in Equation2. The remaining terms represent plant and year xed eects. Note that this specication yields within-plant estimates of the relationship between exposure to PNTR and capital expenditures, but does not account for changes in investment driven by establishment entry and exit.
The rst two columns of Table 4 report the results of estimating equation 4, rst with only the DID term of interest and the xed eects required for its identication (column 1), and then with the full set of covariates (column 2). We nd that while the relationship between exposure to PNTR and total investment is negative, as in the industry-level estimates discussed above, it is not statistically signicant at conventional levels. The next six columns indicate similar negative but statistically insignicant relationships for the two broad categories of investment shares equipment and structures as well as for the log real book value of capital. The overall message of Table 4 is that the relationship between exposure to PNTR and investment within continuing plants is negative but not precisely estimated.
We note that establishment-level results in Table 4 dier from the industry-level estimates in Table 2 for two reasons. First, the samples are dierent.
11 Second, the 11 The samples are dierent in three ways. First, inclusion of plant xed eects in the establishmentlevel analysis means that identication is restricted to within-establishment variation, thereby excluding the impact of establishment exit, which is substantial during this period (Fort, Pierce, and Schott (2017) ; Pierce and Schott (2012) ). Second, these xed eects also exclude plants that are not present in both the pre-and post-PNTR periods. Finally, the establishment-level regressions are restricted to Census years 1992 Census years , 1997 Census years , 2002 Census years and 2007 while the industry-level sample includes data for every 12 Further discussion of the dierences between the industry-and plant-level results in appendix section B.
These terms, which we refer to as plant heterogeneity terms and which we include one-at-a-time in separate regressions, appear as the triple interaction in the second line of equation 5. The normalization divides the 1992 plant attribute by the average of that attribute across all plants in the same industry in 1992, therefore explicitly accounting for heterogeneity within industries, rather than dierences across industries.
13 The third term in equation 5 represents the interaction of the plant heterogeneity term with the P ost P N T R t indicator required to identify the triple interaction. We do not simultaneously include all plant heterogeneity terms in a single regression given their high correlation.
14 Estimates are reported in Table 5 . To conserve space we restrict our reporting to the equipment investment share, as that form of investment accounts for the majority of total investment, and suppress the estimates for the non-DID terms. As indicated in the table, a key dierence between these results and those reported in Table 4 14 One potential concern with our regression specication is that plants with dierent values of initial characteristics may have been on dierent trends prior to the PNTR, and that these trends may drive the relationship between the policy change and the plant heterogeneity terms. In unreported but available results, we control for this possibility by augmenting equation 5 with interactions of year dummies and the plant characteristic being examined. Results are virtually identical to those described below.
plants in 1992. These changes represent -1.1 to -3.2 percent of the mean equipment investment share in 1997, the prior year closest to the change in trade policy. Figures 7 provides a similar plot for the plant heterogeneity DID terms. In this case, the bottom right panel reports the results from the second row of Table 5 . As with the Finally, Figure 8 uses the coecients reported in Figures 6 and 7 , as well as information about the distribution of plants' attributes in 1992, to quantify how the economic impact of PNTR varies across establishments with dierent levels of a particular attribute. In the gure, each pair of bars is computed using coecient estimates from the separate regressions described above (e.g., one of the columns of Table 5 ).
Each bar is an evaluation of the impact of an interquartile shift in exposure to PNTR for a plant with a low versus high level of the noted attribute. We dene the low level of an attribute as the mean less one standard deviation and the high level as the mean plus one standard deviation. We report results for total, structures and equipment investment shares. Economic impacts are expressed as the implied change in the investment share as a percentage of the mean investment share across plants in 1997, the prior year closest to the change in trade policy.
As indicated in the gure, we nd that the impact of greater exposure on low-versus high-attribute establishments varies by attribute but that it is similar across the three types of investment. Our discussion here focuses on total and equipment investment shares given the stronger relationship between exposure to PNTR and these outcomes found above. Combined, the results in this section suggest that the average continuing establishment reduces equipment (and total) investment in response to PNTR relative to the period before the change in trade policy. However, for the subset of plants with relatively high skill intensity, greater exposure to the change in trade policy is associated with relatively higher equipment (and total) investment. This increased investment could represent trade-induced technological change of the type discussed in Bloom, Draca, and Reenen (2016) . Alternatively, it could reect capital expenditures used to upgrade product quality (Schott (2003 (Schott ( , 2004 ) or switch production (Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006); Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2011); Khandelwal (2010)) towards goods more in line with U.S. comparative advantage.
Our results in this section are consistent with those reported in Gutierrez and Philippon (2017) , who nd that while investment in property, plant and equipment is relatively lower for publicly traded rms after PNTR versus before, the relative decline 
Responses in the Timing and Frequency of Investment
PNTR's elimination of the risk of potential tari increases oers a unique setting for examining how uncertainty aects establishments' investment behavior in ways beyond those explored above, in particular its timing and frequency. Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen (2007) , for example, show theoretically that greater uncertainty lowers the responsiveness of rms' investment to demand shocks, provided that investments are at least partially irreversible. In particular, because uncertainty drives a wedge between the marginal products of capital required for investment and disinvestment, it increases the zone of inaction, rendering it lumpier. In this section, we use the ASM to examine how the timing and frequency of investment respond to PNTR.
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As noted above, the ASM has two drawbacks relative to the CM: it is a survey rather than a census; and the survey sample is re-drawn every ve years, complicating one's The third measure is the share of years in each period with positive investment, a measure that captures the frequency with which establishments invest. In practice, as noted in Table 1 , a high share of establishments invest each year, though the share is lower for structures investment. With these measures, we estimate the following equation:
where p indexes establishments and j indexes industries, as before, and c indexes the two time periods. The dependent variable ln(y pc ) is the log of one of the three measures of investment behavior for plant p in period c noted above, and the DID term and control variables are identical to those in Equation 2, with the exception that in equation 6, time-varying control variables are averaged over each period.
As in Section 4.1, Table 6 sets a baseline by reporting coecient estimates and standard errors from estimating equation 6 without controls for plant heterogeneity.
The rst three columns of the table display results for total investment, the next three columns for investment in structures, and the nal three columns for investment in equipment.
The results indicate that higher industry-level exposure to PNTR and therefore a larger reduction in tari rate uncertainty is associated with smaller average investment sizes, a smaller standard deviation of investment across years, and a higher share of years with positive investment. Though the signs for the latter two variables generally are in line with the predictions from Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen (2007) , in that larger reductions in uncertainty lead to investments that are less lumpy (standard deviation) and more frequent (share positive), only one of these relationships the standard deviation of equipment investment is statistically signicant at conventional levels. One potential explanation for the lack of signicance may be that our data are at a relatively infrequent annual frequency, thereby masking variation in the timing of investments within calendar years. 
Conclusion
This paper estimates the investment responses of U.S. manufacturing industries and establishments to the elimination of tari rate uncertainty associated with the U.S.
granting of PNTR to China in October 2000. We use a dierences-in-dierences approach to examine how variation in exposure to PNTR is associated with changes in manufacturing investment and capital stock after the policy change, relative to before.
At the industry-level, we nd that industries more exposed to PNTR experience relative declines in manufacturing investment, both for equipment and structures, and that more-exposed industries experience statistically insignicant declines in the capital stock. Examining a exible specication that makes no assumptions about the timing of the eects of PNTR, we nd that the decline in investment lines up closely with the timing of the granting of PNTR.
At the establishment-level, we nd that there is heterogeneity within industries in terms of how establishments respond to PNTR's trade liberalization. While the average eect of PNTR is to lower investment, for establishments with higher initial levels of labor productivity and of capital and skilled labor intensity, higher exposure to PNTR's trade liberalization is associated with increases in investment. These within-plant increases in investment are consistent with trade-induced technical change, product-upgrading, or other activities that dierentiate U.S. production from import-competing products.
Examining the timing, frequency, and lumpiness of establishments' investment behavior, we nd that larger reductions in uncertainty associated with PNTR are associated declines in the lumpiness of investment, though there is less of a change in behavior for establishments with high initial productivity levels.
In sum, the ndings in this paper provide new information on the eect of trade liberalization on investment, while highlighting the heterogeneous responses of individual plants.
Online Appendix Table 7 illustrates that the dierences between industry-and establishment-level results largely disappear when they are aggregated to the same level and consider the same same dependent variable. Specically, the rst column of the table reports results of estimating equation 2 after starting with the establishment-level sample, aggregating to the industry-level, and using the natural log of total investment as the dependent variable. Comparing the coecient estimate for the DID term in column 1 of Table   7 to the analogous estimate in column 3 of Table 2 indicates that both are negative and statistically signicant, and of similar magnitudes. The implied eect in Table 2 is somewhat larger than that in 
